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PAUL HAZARD AND THE" CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONSCIENCE"* 
By J. McMANNERS 
AN inaugural lecture ought to be concerned with the joys and difficulties and profundities and techniques of one's discipline in general, and constitute a 
declaration of personal loyalty to its mysteries. However, I gave an inaugural 
lecture three years ago, and since--unfortunately-it was published, and since history 
(as we all know) does not repeat itself, I have decided to speak tonight on a specific 
individual theme. But this theme will be considered in a reckless and informal 
manner which, just possibly, may throw some light, if not on the joys and profundities 
of historical study, at least on its techniques, and especially on its difficulties. A 
direct declaration of personal allegiance may be lacking, but at any rate the back-
ground will be highly personal, and the lecturer's usual precaution of concealing the 
struts and stays of his vehicle behind a smooth streamlined surface will not be adopted. 
In an essayl which but lately I contracted to write and which has just been 
completed, I discovered that I had chosen a formula, a sort of basic analogy or 
metaphor, to give unity to the argument, and on reflection, it appeared that this 
formula differed interestingly from the unifying formula which lies behind a great 
work of scholarship on the same historical period which was published exactly a 
quarter of a century ago. It struck me that it might be worth while to attempt to 
retrace the mental processes which had led to this choice, and this lecture is an attempt 
to describe them. But I must begin by referring to the great work which was 
published twenty-five years ago-Paul Hazard's La Crise de la Conscience europeenne 
1680-1715.2 
You will remember how M. Hazard dealt with the years from 1680 to 1715, those 
vivid, prosaic, bitter, erudite and controversial years, making them appear as the 
life-span of the crucial generation in the intellectual history of modern times. " The 
majority of Frenchmen thought like Bossuet: suddenly, they thought like Voltaire-
a revolution had taken place." The illustration is from France, but it is extended 
to the whole of Western Europe. As early as 1680, the ideas of 176o-indeed, of 
178g-were all in existence in germ. At the turn of the seventeenth century, the 
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1" Religion and the Relations of Church and State, 1688-1715 ", New Cambridge Modern 
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spirit of the Renaissance arose again, albeit joylessly (a Renaissance without Rabelais), 
and prepared the transition from a civilization based on duty-duty to God, duty to 
the Prince-to one founded upon the idea of natural rights-the rights of the 
individual, of conscience, of reason, of criticism, the rights of man and the citizen. 
In this analysis, M. Hazard developed two main themes; on the one hand, there was 
a developing attack on the Christian world-outlook, on the other there was the 
simultaneous building-up of the new world-outlook. We study first, " Le Proces du 
Christianisme" and secondly, "La Cite des Hommes". These two major themes 
are carried on in the next great book Hazard wrote, a study of eighteenth-century 
thought,3 where they figure as "The City of God" and" The City of Man ". 
During the last seven or eight months in which I have been working within 
the period of Hazard's" crisis of the European conscience", I have, indirectly, but 
none the less inescapably, been often confronted with his thesis and the problems with 
which he was dealing. Now the historian-alas I-is obliged to wander into the field 
of other and more highly-specialized disciplines-literature, philosophy, theology, 
art, music, even science-and however cautious one may be, there is no evading the 
fact that, sooner or later, qualified or unqualified, consciously or unconsciously, 
one has to make up one's mind. This claim to a universal scope for the historian 
may appear pretentious. But I hasten to add that my foray around the strategic 
marches separating the various fiefs within the kingdom of the humanities is an 
unpretentious expedition indeed, in which I figure, not as a knight-errant who will 
challenge the reigning barons, but as a humble clerk making a tally of their sheep 
and oxen for the pages of my Domesday, or at best, as a minstrel, singing the praises, 
impartially, of each splendid member of the warring aristocracy of the Arts. 
Admitting, then, that my conclusions are the result of unskilled drudgery around the 
more comprehensible fringes of other people's disciplines, in this lecture I should like 
to suggest a rather different formula for interpreting the "crisis of the European 
conscience" from that which shapes the pattern of Paul Hazard's brilliant work. 
It would be interesting to investigate the ancestry of Hazard's decision to give 
decisive importance to the years 1680 to 1715.4 For the moment, however, we need 
go no further back than Leon Brunschwicg's Progres de la Conscience dans la philosophie 
occidentale for a parallel and a contrast. This generation, which Hazard regarded 
as so vigorous and new, was interpreted by Brunschwicg in terms of disintegration. 
An intellectual, as well as a political regency, began in 1715; the fratricidal warfare 
of the great religious giants of the seventeenth century had left Catholic Europe 
3 La Pensee ettropeenne au 18e siecle (2 vols., 1946). 
4 The Goncourts referred to the period 1685-1725 as an "interregnum in French thought ". 
Lecky (History of Rationalism in Europe (2 vols., 1890)), I, pp. 407-8, emphasizes the period 
between Bacon and Locke. E. Dowden, Puritan and Anglican (1900), p. 31, emphasizes the years 
between the publication of the second part of Pilgrim's Progress and the Tale of a Tub-" The 
questions which occupied the minds of the younger generation were new. . . In place of absolute 
dogma and unqualified conclusions we find a sense that truth is relative. . ." etc. For Lanson's 
view-" Voltaire nageait en plein courant ", see his article" Questions diverses sur l'histoire de 
l'esprit philosophique en France avant 1750 ", Rev. d'hist. litt. de la France, 1912, p. 313 et seq. 
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obsessed with fears of heresy, the spiritual atmosphere became too rarified to support 
healthy activity; the way was open for Voltaire. s Now, I must concede that there 
is an element of artificiality in the comparison I have made between Hazard and 
Brunschwicg-they both have a great deal to say, with many nuances and many-sided 
insights, and the word" conscience" in their titles does not have the same content 
for both of them-nevertheless, a sharp contrast remains, which has its interest. 
Indeed, my suggestion would be that the most apposite formula for synthesizing 
recent work on the" crisis of the European conscience" would be one which combines 
Hazard's active theme of attack and innovation with Brunschwicg's concentration 
upon the old intellectual structure; a formula which sees the old striving intelligently 
to renew itself, while, paradoxically, from this effort, hostile and challenging innova-
tion was born. 
Since Hazard wrote, a great deal has been published, and there is obviously 
no time to refer now to more than a fraction of this material-and in any case, my 
knowledge of it is limited. One can refer only to some of the main tendencies of the 
new work. Annie Barnes' fine study of Jean Le Clerc, R. L. Colie's Cambridge 
Platonists and Dutch Arminians, and Stromberg's Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth-
Century England6 are examples of books geographically centred on the intellectual 
capitals of Protestantism. From Paris, the "crisis of the European conscience" 
may look like a conspiracy against Catholicism; from Geneva (where liberal 
theologians were in the ascendant from 1706 onwards), from Holland (that haunt 
of Arminianism and heterodoxy) or from latitudinarian London, developments fit more 
naturally into the theme of internal tensions within Christianity itself. When Paul 
Hazard wrote, it was still possible, indeed it was natural, to speak in terms of a clash 
between religion and science; but the main tendency of subsequent work has been to 
expel this essentially nineteenth-century assumption from interpretations of the seven-
teenth century. In the year in which La Crise de la conscience europeenne was published, 
a brief article appeared which-it so happened-was destined to initiate a theoretical 
discussion which may yet become as famous as Weber's" Calvinism and Capitalism ,. 
hypothesis-a discussion of the linkages between Puritanism and the rise of the 
scientific attitude. 7 A third characteristic of recent work upon our period is, I think, 
the intervention in force of the historical theologians and the ecclesiastical historians. 
In addition to all the research on straightforward religious history we now have 
excellent monographs on the idea of the Church in both Protestant and Catholic 
• L. Brunschwicg. Le Progres de la Conscience dans la philosophie occidentale. Vol. I. pp. 222, 
268. 
• A. Barnes, Jean Le Clerc et la Republique des Lettres (1938); R. L. Colie. Light and Enlighten-
ment: a Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians (1957); R. N. Stromberg. 
Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth Century England (1954), 
• Dorothy Stimson ... Puritanism and the New Philosophy in Seventeenth Century England". 
Bull. of the Institute of the History of Medicine (Johns Hopkins University), Vol. III. NO·5 (1935). 
pp. 321-32. For a bibliography of subsequent writings, see R. S. Westfall, Science and Religion 
in Seventeenth-Century England (1958). p. 7. and J. K. Rabb, .. Puritanism and the Rise of Experi-
mental Science in England ", Cahiers d'histoire mondiale. Vol. II (1962). pp. 46-67. 
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theology,8 on the implications of the Eucharistic controversy,9 on the Catholic 
apologists' deliberate use of scepticism,l0 on the idea of doctrinal development,l1 
on Socinian propaganda,12 on Gallicanism,13 on the intellectual background of 
Jansenism in both France and Italy.14 It is evident that the" crisis of the European 
conscience" is a phenomenon which can be illustrated at least as cogently from the 
writings of the contemporary theologians, apologists and antiquaties15 as from 
literature and philosophy. We can learn the same lesson from the contributions of 
the school of American historians who concentrate on the history of ideas. It is 
significant that three of the most important works of these scholars-Lovejoy's 
Great Chain of Being, Tuveson's Millennium and Utopia, and Marjorie Hope 
Nicolson's Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory16-all emphasize the role of meta-
physical and theological speculation (as against the sheer impact of scientific discovery) 
in forming the modern world-outlook. The specialist study of the history of ideas 
has also helped to detach us from concentration on brilliant isolated outbursts of 
the literature of dissidence in favour of a closer consideration of the average level 
of conventional argument and assumption. Bayle has been misunderstood in the 
past because he was studied too much in isolation as a sardonic iconoclast, while for 
me, F. E. Manuel's fascinating The Eighteenth Century confronts the GOdS17 has the 
effect of putting Fontenelle into a more serious, less ironical context. Then finally, 
if the" crisis of the European conscience" is the curtain-raiser to the Enlightenment, 
one should note that our ideas of the Enlightenment are changing. The unsubtle 
portrayal of Voltaire as an anti-clerical anti-Christ-as a nineteenth-century Voltairean 
indeed-against which Chaponniere protested in I932,18 is no longer possible after 
Pomeau's19 superb monograph. The affinities, as well as the differences, between 
Christian apologists and the philosophes are now being emphasized; Crocker20 speaks 
8 R. Voeltzel, Vraie et fa1tss~ Eglise selon les theologiens protestants franyais du XVIIe siecle 
(1956); G. Thils, Les Notes de l'Eglise dans l'apologetique catholique depuis la Reforme (1937). 
9 R. Snoeks, L'Argument de tradition dans la controverse eucharistique entre catholiques et 
reformes franyais au XVIIe siecle (1951). 
10 L. 1. Bredvold, The Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden (newed. 1956). 
11 Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman: the Idea of Doctrinal Development (1957). 
12 E. M. Wilbur, A History of Unitarianism; Socianism and its Antecedents (1946). 
13 J. Martimort, Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet (1954). 
14 A bibliography covering Italy and France in detail may be compiled from E. Appolis, 
Entre Jansenistes et Zelanti: Ie "tiers Parti" catholique au XVIIIe siecle (1960). In addition, 
one ought to mention R. Taveneaux, Le Jansenisme en Lorraine (1960), with important new 
information on the movement of ideas and scholarship in the Congregation of Saint-Vanne. 
15 For an introduction to their writings, see D. C. Douglas, English Scholars, 1660-1730 
(1939, new ed. 1951); M. D. Knowles, "The Bollandists", Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 5th Ser., 
Vol. VIII (1958), and" The Maurists", ibid., Vol. IX (1959). Notice the weight given to this 
~ide of intellectual achievement in H. Busson, La Religion des Classiques 1660-85 (1948). 
16 Published in 1936, 1949 and 1960 respectively. 
17 Published in 1960. 
18" If Voltaire had not existed, they'd have had to invent him, and as a matter of fact, 
that's what they have done" (P. Chaponniere, Voltaire chez les Calvinistes (1932), p. 32). 
19 R. Pomeau, La Religion de Voltaire (1956). 
20 Lester G. Crocker, An Age of Crisis, Man and World in Eighteenth-Century French Thought 
(1959), especially p. 255. 
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of eighteenth-century ethical theory as accepting a secularized version of the Christian 
dew of man's dual nature, Palmer21 shows orthodox and unbelievers agreeing in a 
common concept of nature which only Jansenists and a few sceptical materialists 
rejected. Today, to write in round terms of the warfare between Church and 
Philosophes is a little old-fashioned, or at least, one prefaces everything by references 
to the great areas of common assumptions shared by both sides, and makes continual 
qualifications about the internal differences which fissure each group of combatants. 
Voltaire remained all his life an old-boy of Louis-le-Grand, an ex-pupil of the Jesuits,22 
and nothing darkened his later years more than the materialists who would have the 
Sage of Ferney descended from a cod-fish. 
Viewed, then, from Protestant centres rather than from Paris, freed from the 
anachronistic myth of a war between religion and science, expanded in scope by 
extended interests in technical theology and apologetics, and seen as a prelude to a 
more complicated Enlightenment, the "crisis of the European conscience", so it 
seems to me, is more appropriately described as a fermentation within a Christian 
intellectual milieu than a corroding attack from without. It is a civil war, street-
fighting in the capital, rather than an eruption of invaders through the decaying 
frontier line. 
Now I hasten to say that my view of the crisis as essentially a crisis within 
Christianity is not meant to be an exclusive interpretation. Inevitably, any survey 
of " the Spirit of an age" will end with an analogy. M. Orcibal concludes a recent 
paper23 on the idea of the Church in our period by describing Catholicism, at the 
opening of the eighteenth century, as a fortress under attack by Gallicans, Jansenists, 
sceptics and unbelievers. Rene Pintard's monumental thesis on the libertins24 ends 
by referring to the flood waters which cover the eighteenth-century landscape as 
having accumulated throughout the previous century in rivulets, hidden from the 
general gaze by the opulent vegetation of Christianity and classicism. One accepts 
these analogies (both making the " crisis" external to Christianity) and works with 
them so far-yet it is possible to prefer a different sort of formula for one's overall 
summary. These choices of formula and analogy, and the order of effectiveness one 
awards to them, are important. The layman may feel impatient with the historian 
and urge him to get on with the job of writing history, whatever trimmings he may 
adopt. But a formula which is adopted merely to give unity to the presentation, 
or a metaphor accepted merely to enliven the prose, can very easily become the core 
of the whole interpretation. When one speaks, for example, of the long feud between 
Germany and France, is it in terms of two predetermined opposites, self-justified 
existences, Leviathans that devour, or is it in terms of a civil war within an entity 
called Europe, which geographers, economists, linguists, anthropologists and students 
21 R. R. Palmer, Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth-Century France (1939). 
22 Pomeau emphasizes the fact that he remained impregnated with their" catholicity", 
even though their Christian teaching was wasted on him. 
23 J. Orcibal, " L'Idee de l'Eglise chez les catholiques du ISe siecle ", Relazioni del X Congresso 
Internazionale di Scienza Storiche, Vol. IV (n.d. 1957 ?), pp. 111-135. 
24 R. Pintard, Le Libertinage erudit dans la premiere moitie du XVII" siecle (2 vols., 1943), 
pp. 573:II· 
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of art and literature must help the historian to define? Or is it both-and if so, 
which formula will be most comprehensively employed? Similarly, the interpretation 
of the "crisis of the European conscience" poses a choice between two types of 
analogy-that of opposing forces on the one hand, and that of forces growing within 
forces on the other. Both may be employed, but which is to be employed most 
comprehensively? 
From one point of view (though, as I have suggested, this is not the ideal formula-
tion) the critical intellectual tensions of the transitional period between the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries may be described as a gathering assault upon the Christian 
fortress, We are all familiar with the composition of the attacking forces. Scientific 
views of causation undermine miracles, historical scholarship rejects legend, " reason" 
becomes the test of religion, the Cartesian tradition insists upon strict demonstration 
and clarity, Socinian propaganda moves on from scriptural liberalism to rationalistic 
simplicity, the French libertins are being read again, and there is a renewed interest 
in some of their original sources-the epicurean philosophy and Lucretius; the 
shades of Hobbes and Spinoza, but lately dead, haunt the theologians; Locke rejects 
innate ideas, the English Deists challenge revelation (Toland's Christianity not 
Mysterious, published in r696), Fontenelle's attack on the oracles has sinister implica-
tions; Bayle's Dictionary appeared in r697, a work which was to be a handbook of 
scepticism throughout the eighteenth century. 
But when in August, r7II, Voltaire left the classes of his Jesuit schoolmasters, 
the future still held alternative possibilities. It is misleading to isolate within the 
Enlightenment only those tendencies which were hostile to Christianity, ignoring the 
common ground between apologists and Philosophes, and a fortiori it is more dangerou~ 
still to work back from this point, regarding" the crisis of the European conscience" 
simply as the prelude to an intellectual conspiracy. 
We have noted that the Cartesian tradition demanded strict demonstration and 
clarity, and it is true that there were those who saw in its rigours a suitable camouflage 
for attacks on religion. "A great battle against the church is being mounted", 
wrote Bossuet in r687, "under the flag of the Cartesian philosophy", 25 and five year~ 
later the Jesuit Pere Daniel was afraid that the Cartesian path led to materialism,26 
Yet, as we know, in our period Cartesianism was captured for Christian philosophy 
by Malebranche and Arnauld, it duly became accepted in the Jesuit and Oratorian 
colleges of France and, as a recent writer has observed, the eighteenth century was 
capable of seeing Cartesianism solely through" an incense-laden apologetic mist ",27 
And here, in passing, one ought, perhaps, to say a word about Hobbes and Spinoza. 
They lie rather before our period, but their influence runs through it, and these two 
sinister figures are, above all others, qualified to fit into the theme of an attack on 
the fortress of Christianity-if cohorts are moving up to the assault, Hobbes and 
26 Oeuvres, ed, Migne (1865), XI, CoL 974. 
26 Voyage du monde de Descartes (1692), 
27 A, Vartarnian, Diderot and Descartes.' a Study of Scientific Naturalism in the Enlightenme>ll 
(J933), p. 38. 
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Spinoza are in the van, directing the battering-rams. Yet, on examination, their 
position is peculiar. Hobbs aroused great panic and no doubt his motives were 
devious, but it is worth pointing out that he wreaked his greatest devastation by 
crudely accepting unexceptionable Biblical propositions-that inspiration must 
be direct, not second-hand, that the resurrection of the body is true doctrine, not the 
immortality of the soul, that the Hebraic God of irrational will is the Christian Deity, 
not the serene, reasonable Godhead of the Greeks which the Church had appropriated 
to modify the original concept.28 Hobbes had no real footing in the scientific 
movement of his age, and though he loved geometry he knew nothing about it-his 
method is not geometrical or new, it is rather an anti-method, a sardonic and deliberate 
reversal of the arguments from Scripture and the conventional assumptions that the 
theologians used. The voice of Hobbes spoke from inside the very Christian argu-
ment; the disproportionate fear he aroused among ecclesiastics is due to this very 
fact. Spinoza, it is true, stands right outside the Christian intellectual structure-
but it is significant that, as Verniere29 has shown, his influence was essentially indirect. 
His alien status made his readers unwilling to admit their alarm or indebtedness. 
In our period, Spinoza's impact was felt, not towards pantheism or determinism, but 
towards a new view of the Biblical documents-but here, it is notable that what he 
said did not become an issue until the theme was taken up by Richard Simon,30 
the Oratorian-i.e. taken up inside the fortress, by one of the garrison, not from the 
outside. However, I must leave this excursus on Hobbes and Spinoza and return 
to the thinkers who flourished within the strict limits of the period of the crisis of 
the European conscience. Most scientists then were convinced Christians (men 
like John Ray and Robert Boyle were entirely dominated by Christian inspirations) 
acutely aware, as Westfall has recently shown, that some of the concepts they were 
using were dangerous to their faith, and attempting to take precautions. The 
historians who demolished legends were ecclesiastics-non-juring divines and 
latitudinarian bishops, Jesuit Bollandists, Jansenist liturgiologists, Oratorians, 
Benedictines of the order of Saint-Maur. So, too, of philosophers, were Malebranche 
and Berkeley; Locke was sincerely anxious to find rational grounds for religious 
assent, Shaftesbury received the Sacrament blessing the Providence which had kept 
the Church of England free from" monstrous enthusiasm ".31 The most prominent 
Socinian writer in England was a respectable country clergyman.32 Calvinist refugees 
dominated the" Republic of Letters" in Holland; Jean Le Clerc was unorthodox 
on the Trinity but otherwise doctrinally sound,33 and Bayle, that prince of sceptics, 
28 W. B. Glover, " God and Thomas Hobbes ", Church History, Sept. 1960, pp. 275 et seq. 
,. P. Verniere, Spinoza et la pensee jran'iaise avant la Revolution (2 vols., J944) 
ao Taken up, one might add, as a Catholic device to undermine the Protestant reliance on the 
Bible, and not in the spirit of Renan (see H. Freville, .. Richard Simon et les Protestants d'apres 
sa correspondence", Rev. d'kist. moderne, Vol. VI (I931)). 
3) R. L. Brett, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, a St1~dy in Eighteenth-Century Literary TheOl'V 
(195 1), pp. 46-7 
32 M. J. McLachlan, Socianism in Seventeenth-Century England (I9.;r). pp. 313 et seq. 
;]3 A. Barnes, op. cit., pp. 237 et seq. 
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was an austere practising believer. The gulf between the actual sentiments of 
Pierre Bayle and the use that was eventually made of his writings is so great that for 
long he was regarded as an intellectual desperado keeping one foot planted in the 
door of the sacristy awaiting the decisive push of the Philosophes, an old misconception 
which provides an example of the way in which this earlier period can be distorted 
by looking at it through the atmosphere of the high eighteenth century. Recent work 
on Bayle3l returns to Saint-Beuve's dictum-" Bayle etait religieux ", a verdict 
based, not so much on his communicating four times a year, but on his self-revelation 
in private correspondence. With a Calvinist view of human nature and a conviction 
that men use reason merely as camouflage for the dictates of passion, Bayle turned 
inwards to a religious illumination which was all there was to live by. It was a pale, 
cold flame, but beyond its narrow circle there was darkness, delusively lit from time 
to time by the lightning flashes of passion, and blocked by an impassable tangle of 
the ruins of human endeavour at rational construction. Bayle, Locke and the 
seminal thinkers of this era may have deviated from strict orthodoxy-but no more 
so than Milton (whose heresy, it now appears, was not Arianism, but Nestorianism 
and Docetism35), nor did their divergencies into heterodoxy travel through any greater 
distance than the Christian churches had already travelled from each other. These 
writers maintained religious practice and insisted that they adhered to Christianity. 
Thus, while from one point of view the" clisis of the European conscience" may be 
regarded as a gathering attack upon the religious fortress, its total significance is 
better seized if we see it essentially as a crisis within Christianity itself. "Reason", 
" Scepticism", and "Science" were, in this period, being used to explain, defend and 
re-interpret religion. As this process went on, two things were happening; arguments 
were scattered abroad and fell into the hands of agnostics and anticlericals, and, at 
the same time, changes were forced within the religious outlook, changes whose 
importance we can easily overlook if we insist on using the terminology of warfare to 
describe tensions of belief. Such terminology tends to concentrate on differences, 
rather than on the common ground of agreement, and encourages the assumption 
(often incorrect) that a monolithic intellectual unity has a superior survival value 
to a diversified and (even) conflicting complex of ideas. The period of the" crisis 
of the European conscience" may mark the origins of modernity-but if so, it was 
the beginning of modern times for both the apologists and the opponents of 
Christianity. 
" Reason ", "Scepticism", and " Science "-these ambiguous, all-embracing 
portmanteau words, are the essential stock-in-trade of the student of the period of the 
3. See P. Dibon's introduction to Pierl'e Bayle, Ie Philosophe de Rotterdam (1959), and W. H, 
Barber, " Pierre Bayle: Faith and Reason", in The French }\lind, studies in honour of Gustave 
!ludler (1952). It has been remarked that Bayle's irony was that of Erasmtls, not of Voltaire 
(Labrousse, in Dibon, op. cit., p. 112). "Every day of our lives", wrote Bayle, typically, " we 
give our allegiance to truths while ridiculing some of the proofs on which they are supposed to be 
hased" (1'. Denis, "Lettres inM. de P. Bayle ", Rev. hist. lilt., 1912, p. 924). 
35 W. B. Hunter, .. Milton's Arianism Reconsidered", Harvard Theological Review, Vol. LII 
(l959), pp. 9 et seq.; "Milton on the Incarnation: some more Heresies ", Journal History of 
Ideas, Vol. XXI (3), 1960, PP 349 et seq. 
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" crisis of the European conscience". It has often been suggested that a threat to 
religion was implied in Locke's use of reason,36 in his rule that revelation has 
independent status, but that reason must judge what may properly be termed 
revelation. Yet, as has recently been pointed out, Locke and Tillotson were simply 
repeating the traditional teaching of Hooker and the Anglican theologians,37 a teaching 
fully accepted by the Puritans and summed up by Baxter in The Judgement of Non-
conformists of the Interest of Reason in Matters of Religion (1676). English Pro-
testantism (and New England's Protestantism, too, whose deep cultural interests 
are now being particularly studied and emphasized)38 was reluctant to concede that 
the Fall had irredeemably tainted the human intellect, and preferred, with Milton 
and the Cambridge Platonists, to see the primaeval tragedy as consisting in the 
overthrow of reason by the passions.39 I t may have been wicked to achieve an empire 
by eating of the forbidden tree, but it would certainly be folly to abdicate now-thus 
Anglican and Puritan alike proposed to cooperate with redemption by providing 
rational proofs for religion. One can see how the search for these proofs led to con-
troversy among the orthodox, culminating in Samuel Clark's Scriptural Doctrine of 
the Trinity (1712); one can see the point at which Locke crossed the frontiers of 
danger40 ; one can see how the Deists welcomed the opportunity to set forth the 
minimum of Locke's "reasonable Christianity" as their maximum. From 
reasonable religion, too, came" natural religion" and" natural morality". Before 
Shaftesbury said virtue should be its own reward, Cudworth41 had said so, in the 
course of refuting those who claimed that good and evil are the result of God's 
arbitrary choice (and those who said so include Descartes, the Calvinists and Hobbes--
an interesting affinity). But it was the Jesuits who took the decisive step. Are 
unbaptized infants and virtuous pagans damned? Arnauld, the Jansenist, gave 
the rigorist answer, in defiance of human reason. 41a By contrast, the Jesuits praised 
the noble savage-and we are now coming to appreciate that they well knew that this 
was a fiction.42 One is inclined to think that the really effective exotic literature, 
so far as religious problems were concerned, was the Jesuit Relations. Who really 
cared for the romancers ?-for Foigny's Terre Australe (1676),43 with its Australians, 
all hermaphrodites and spending their leisure worshipping an incomprehensible, a 
3. E.g., B. Willey, The Eighteenth-Century Background (1957), pp. 267 et seq. 
37 S. L. Bethell, The Cultural Revolution of the Seventeenth Century (1951), Chapter I, " The 
Doctrinal Treatment of Faith and Reason in Seventeenth-Century Anglican Theology". 
38 S. E. Morison, The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England (1956); Perry Miller, The 
New England l'vlind : from Colony to Province (1953), and The New England jVIind: the Seventeenth 
Century (1954), 
39 B. Willey, ap. cit., p. 249. 
40 See the discussion of Locke in D. G. James, The Life of Reason: Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbl'uke 
(1949). 
U J. A. Passmore, Ralph CudwOl,th (1951), pp. 40-1. 
4la Jean Laporte, La Doctrine de fort-Royal II (I) Exposition de la Doctrine d'apres Arnauld, 
pp. 98-101, 115-7, 120, 137-8. 
42 G. R. Healey, "The French Jesuits and the Idea of the Noble Savage". Willia·/tl alld Army 
Quarterly, 3rd Series, XV (1958), pp. 143 et seq. 
43 G. Chi nard , L'Amtft'ique et Ie reve exotique (1913), pp. 200-5. 
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work of fiction which, one is glad to note, turned out to be prophetic only in the second 
of these characteristics. The Jesuits, too, evoked the shimmering mirage of China, 
an unbaptized civilization which had found the true God. This, then, was the 
discussion about natural morality, which Bayle, with his virtuous atheist, carried 
to its logical conclusion. 
Protestant exponents of "reasonable" religion were naturally exasperated by 
the Catholic apologists' deliberate use of scepticism. The Papists, wrote Bishop 
Burnet angrily, "went so far even unto the argument for atheism as to publish 
many books in which they affirmed that there was no certain proof of the Christian 
religion, unless we took it from the authority of the Church as infallible". 44 Richard 
Simon of the Oratory, the founder after Spinoza of Biblical criticism, was, in his aims, 
a Catholic polemicist, aiming to destroy Protestant reliance on the Scriptures. It is 
interesting to notice that the Quakers,45 also, welcomed the detection of errors which 
drove men from the letter that killeth to the inner witness of the Spirit, and that 
Jesuits used similar tactics to weaken the Protestant appeal to the Fathers.45a But, 
while Simon pushed forward the frontiers of scholarship, his polemical mania was 
becoming unfashionable. English scholars depended on Gallican scholars to defend 
the validity of Anglican orders, Gallican scholars welcomed the work of the English 
divines who defended the patristic writings, Protestants followed up Simon's 
hypotheses about Genesis,46 in spite of all his conspiratorial aims, and divines of all 
parties joined to demolish legends. A respect for disinterested investigation was 
uniting the scholars of Christian Europe. In the short run, the crisis of the European 
conscience focused the critical attack on Biblical inerrancy, which Bossuet had 
foreseen when he condemned Richard Simon: in the long run, it marks the founding 
of an independent scholarly milieu within which the historians and theologians of all 
parties could debate with common standards of intellectual integrity. 
With respect to the part played by "science" in the crisis of the European 
conscience, I have hardly time to speak. But one thing, perhaps, may be said; 
that is, the view that dramatic scientific discoveries brought a challenge to 
religion-in the form of ideas of inevitable progress, the immensity of the Universe, 
the invariable rule of natural causes, and the possibility of a plurality of worlds-
needs so many qualifications that one is tempted to abandon it altogether in inter-
preting this period. Whatever other roots the idea of inevitable progress had, it has 
now been shown that it also was greatly influenced by the seventeenth-century writers 
of apocalyptic speculations,41 and by the Protestant reply to Bossuet's accusation of 
" variations" -the reply that "God dispenseth not all his favours together", 48 
44 Burnet, History of his Own Time (I839 ed.), p. I29. 
45 Braithwaite, The Second Period of Quakerism (I9I9), pp. 289 fl. So too did Milton 
(Tillyard, Studies in Milton (I95I), pp. 15I-2). 
45& Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, pp. 50-8. 
46 A. Lods, " Astruc et la critique biblique de son temps ", Rev. d'hist. et de philosophie 
religieuse, March-April, I924, pp. I24 et seq. 
uSee E. L. Tuveson, Millenium to Utopia (I949). 
48 R. S. Crane, "Anglican Apologetics and the Idea of Progress, I699-I745 ", IYlodern 
Philology, XXXI (I934). 
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and that doctrinal development was necessary and certain. The new Universe was 
accepted with enthusiasm by the apologists, in the spirit of John Ray's opening 
:;entence, "how manifold are thy works, 0 Lord" ;49 the ordered immensity and 
minute complexity which telescope and microscope revealed became new testimony 
to the Creator's grandeur. The hypothesis of a plurality of worlds (a good excuse to 
stroll with a channing lady in the moonlight) had been argued since Saint Augustine, 50 
and the consensus of feeling in its favour at the end of the seventeenth century owed 
more to the Platonic and Christianized principle of plenitude5! (that is, that God 
would abhor a vast and useless emptiness) than to scientific discovery. This age 
combined its theology and science in a way that is strange to us, as has been recently 
illustrated in a fascinating study of the revolution which took place in its aesthetic 
assumptions. 52 For long, mountains had been regarded as gloomy, ugly excrescences, 
and the old argument of Lucretius, that the world must be of fortuitous origin 
(otherwise it would be attractively smooth) still flourished. Thomas Burnet used 
science and the legend of the Flood to defend Creation and show how things had 
gone wrong-but More, the Cambridge Platonist, Ray, Bentley and the Reverend 
Erasmus Warren produced the more satisfying argument that mountains are beautiful, 
useful, and part of the Creator's design; from this point, John Dennis and Addison 
went on to develop theories of the sublime which linked the overwhelming universe of 
astronomy more surely with the religious feelings. 
In retrospect, one can sense that the crucial problem which science was posing 
for religion in this age was that of reconciling Providence with a mechanistic universe. 
Actually, however, the age for the most part did make this reconciliation, to its own 
satisfaction, on Boyle's principle that" it much more tends to the illustration of 
God's wisdom to have so fonned things at first that there can seldom or never need 
any extraordinary interposition of His power". 53 This was not merely the prejudice 
of (if the term may be used without misunderstanding) a "Christian scientist". 
Malebranche, for example, to the rage of Arnauld, held that God rested the seventh 
day and from henceforward rules by volonh\s generales rather than by particular 
interventions. 54 And it is also worth noting that this age absorbed the problem of 
Providence in a mechanistic universe within a much larger one, a problem as old 
as the Book of Job, the problem of evil. Providence is just as hard to justify in a 
universe where evil is rampant as in one which is ruled by natural laws-indeed, the 
scientific picture of such a universe was then used as a partial explanation of the 
age-old problem of evil. And here, we are at the heart of the" crisis of the European 
conscience". Here, in the problem of evil, is the essence of Bayle's attack on 
rationality, whether it be the rationality of Christianity, or the rationality of the 
.9 John Ray, The Wisdom of God AIanifested in the Works of Creation (r69r). 
50 G. McColley, "The Seventeenth Century Doctrine of a Plurality of Worlds ", Annals of 
.';"ience, I (r936), pp. 385 et seq. 
51 A. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (r936), pp. 99 et seq. 
52 See Marjorie Hope Nicholson, op. cit. 
53 See Westfall, op. cit., pp. 82-6. 
54 See H. Gouhier, La Philosophie de ]\I{alebranche et son experience religieuse (r926). 
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Enlightenment. It is impossible for us now to rehearse the answers that were 
attempted; Cudworth's" plastic nature ", which was God's drudge to carry on the 
process of creation (followed by Le Clerc and John Ray), the human limitations of 
Christ in his role as Mediator in Malebranche's philosophy, the necessary defect 
involved in creative differentiation of Bishop King, the eternal truths that bind even 
the Godhead, of Leibniz. Leibniz's Essais de Theodicee (1710) was the key work 
of this period. His" best of all possible worlds" is, in one sense, the peak of reason-
able religion and of humanistic optimism; in another, it implies and foreshadows the 
defeat of reasonable religion and the breakdown of the Enlightenment, for if all partial 
evil is universal good, whatever is, is right, and pessimism and optimism are just 
different words for the same thing. 
Inevitably, what I have said tonight touches only certain aspects of the subject 
and, probably, not the most important ones. Ideas, seen simply in their coordinating 
or contrasting patterns, have been discussed, and the crisis of the European conscience 
has been described as if it formed a nexus of purely intellectual tensions. But ideas 
unchallenged by events tend to be like machines invented before the social and 
economic demand has arisen for their usefulness-they remain portents on the margins 
of history. In the period of the crisis of the European conscience, however, the rich 
and developing pattern of ideas in Western Europe met with decisive challenge from 
three major events-it had three moments of catalytic development forced upon it. 
Louis XIV's expulsion of the Huguenots, the English Revolution and the quarrel 
over the Bull Unigenitus forced a reconsideration of the whole problem of authority 
in both Church and State, and as between Church and State. I t would be difficult 
to "invent" three incidents better calculated to hasten on the movement of the 
developing patterns of human speculation, and to usher in an Age of Reason. In 
face of them, the old method of argument from Scripture collapsed- Bayle's 
commentary on "Compel them to come in " enforced the lesson that toleration was 
implicit in the total sense of the Gospels and in naturall'eason, which even the Bible 
could not flout; an English archdeacon summed up the debate of churchmen on the 
Glorious Revolution by ridiculing the mere possibility that Scripture could be validly 
cited against a people's liberties-" there be prime laws of Nature and Reason that 
our Blessed Saviour came to fulfil, not to destroy ".55 The Jansenists themselves, 
long skilled in the art of manoeuvring authority on to the wrong foot (you will 
remember how they condemned the five Propositions but could not find them in 
Jansenius) contributed to the Age of Reason, which they otherwise detested, by 
insisting on the commonsense meaning of the 101 Propositions; they rejected the 
right of authority to condemn forms of words in odium auctoris-what must be plainly 
accepted, must be plainly stated. 56 In face of these three challenges, persecuted 
Huguenots appealed to the conscience of civilization, and even to the sovereignty of 
55 K. G. Feiling, History of the Tory Party, 1640-1714 (1924), pp. 491-2. 
56 See the modern controversy between J. F. Thomas, La Querelle de Unigenitus (1930), 
p. 60, and J. Orcibal, Rev. historique, CCVIII (1952), p. 321. 
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the people, 57 English ecclesiastics appealed to natural rights and constitutional 
liberties, Jansenists appealed to a future General Counci1. 58 It was a generation of 
appeals-appeals to a reason which lay beyond established authority. The next 
step was to invoke a General Will, or to call an Estates General-and to meet reality. 59 
In another, and equally important, sense, events were pressing upon ideas-or rather 
upon ideals-in this period. The increasing complexities of civilization and the 
vision of human amelioration were pressing upon the simplicities of the New 
Testament, and leading to attempts to remould Christian ethical stereotypes. 60 No 
doubt this process is always going on, but the activity now was feverish, many-sided, 
and full of fertile contradictions-Jesuit probabilists and Jansenist probabiliorists; 
Fenelon fighting Bossuet for a new formulation of an ideal of aristocratic piety, and 
grafting an anticipation of Rousseauistic sensibilite on to the pattern of Catholic 
devotion; the exponents and opponents of Christian Stoicism; the writers of Puritan 
and Pietistic biography and autobiography; the essayists, who redefined the ideal 
57 See, in particular, G. H. Dodge, The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion 
(1947)· 
58 For the genesis and the precedents of this appeal, see Orcibal's Louis XIV contre Innocent 
XI: les appels au futur concile de 1688 et l'opinion franc;aise (1949). 
59 This statement does not, of course, apply to England. Here, the appeal to natural rights 
was realistic from the start. The doctrines of obedience which James II apparently relied on were, 
in general, held with realistic, even if not always conscious, qualifications (see the comments of 
Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, pp. 2II-12, 238-9; of C{)dfrey Davies, " Tory Churchmen and 
James II ", Essays on the Later Stuarts (1958), pp. 77-83; and the citation from Hickes (1683) 
in G. R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, p. 175). Though the fiction of " abdica-
tion " was used by some to keep an untarnished theory of non-resistance, most churchmen naturally 
turned to practical and traditional arguments. There were the "laws of England. . . like the 
dykes of Holland" (E. Carpenter, The Protestant Bishop: Henry Compton (1956), p. 84); there 
was the subject's right to his religion as part of his property (T. E. Clarke and H. C. Foxcroft, 
A Life of Gilbert Burnet (1907), pp. 244-5); there was the Hobbesian commonsense proposition 
that a sovereign who cannot give protection is no longer sovereign (G. V. Bennett, White Kennett, 
Bishop of Peterborough (1957). p. 12; A. Tindall Hart, William Lloyd (1952), p. lI8). As Berkeley 
pointed out, non-resistance could be maintained intact while, at the same time, the credentials 
of the authority claiming to issue orders subversive of one's beliefs could very properly be narrowly 
investigated (A. A. Luce, Life of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (1949), p. 53). Following this 
line of attack, it was easy to come to conclusions of satisfying constitutional importance-" but 
what if neither King James nor King William be our supreme magistrate; but a collective body 
made up of King and parliament together? And this is indeed our case. . ." (N. Sykes, William 
Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1657-1737 (2 vols., 1957), I, p. 47). And there was a general 
feeling that theoretical premises could not be allowed to end up in intolerable and unreasonable 
practical consequences. Compton (Carpenter, op. cit., p. 87) in 1686 used words (" the king may 
ravish their wives, spoil their goods ... " etc.) which anticipate Swift's famous statement of the 
case (" I will suppose him to murder his mother. . . to ravish matrons, to blow up the Senate", 
in The Sentiments of a Church of England JUan, Prose Works, ed. W. Davies, Vol. II, p. 22). This 
theme of the abandonment of arguments from supposed divine rights and scriptural maxims in 
favour of commonsense can be similarly traced in other English ecclesiastical controversies of the 
time-over the supposed" divine right of tithe" (see L. A. Landa, Swift and the Church of Ireland 
(1954), pp. 127-30), among the Non-Jurors concerning the continuance of the schism against 
" the interest of mankind in general (which is an argument of right) " (see G. Every, The High 
Church Party 1688-1718 (1956)), and above all in the Convocation Controversy. In this dispute 
Qne side monopolized the argument from tradition and precedent, and the other, in its own view, 
monopolized that from natural right and common reason, thus forming a contrast with the debate 
concerning the revolutionary settlement of the Throne, where the coincidence of the two arguments 
made the appeal to "reason" essentially realistic, rather than theoretical. 
8. A discussion of this problem occupies the last third of my essay for the N.C.M.H. 
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of the gentleman, and the satirists who disposed of the outworn honnete homme-
all this activity is of the essence of the crisis of the European conscience. 
But perhaps I ought to conclude by admitting that behind my view of this 
crisis lie certain personal feelings. Perhaps the real importance of the strictly 
religious history of this age lies elsewhere-entirely elsewhere-with the Jesuits, 
by-words for worldly finesse in Europe, who were adventuring out among the North 
American savages and the polished civilization of China and on the wild road to Lhassa, 
with the foundation of the S.P.c.K. and the S.P.G., which mark the belated beginning 
of Protestant missionary interest. The period of the crisis of the European conscience 
foreshadows at once the intellectual difficulties which Christianity was to face in the 
future-and the fantastic period of missionary expansion which marks the nineteenth 
century. 61 But, confining the discussion to Europe, I feel obliged to admit that what 
I have said about the crisis of the European conscience being a crisis internal to 
Christianity rather than external to it, springs from doubts I have about even wider 
pre-suppositions. 
I doubt if the temporary alliance of religion with culture and to some extent 
with authority in the Middle Ages entitles mediaeval civilization to be called 
" Christian" any more than modern secular civilization, and I suspect that modern 
secular civilization is given its peculiar flavour and outlook by technological progress, 
industrialization, population surges and crude mass literacy rather than by revolutions 
of ideas. In Hazard's superb book the central figure is Bossuet, despairing but 
unbowed, fighting rearguard actions against Protestants, Socinians, Cartesians, 
Biblical critics, mystics and the world in general on behalf of an unchanging doctrine 
and an eternal corporation. By contrast, I confess that I like to look at the age 
through the eyes of Swift, who, caught in the toils himself, defended with masochistic 
irony the cause of "nominal Christianity", 62 real Christianity, as he said, having 
been generally rejected since primitive times. To Bossuet, Christian history was a 
sombre heroic battle of armies with standards glittering in the gale; Swift saw, with 
terrible clarity, that the true continuous history of Christianity has been one of 
compromise. 
61 The emphasis on the nineteenth century in K. S. Latourette, A History of the Expansion 
of Christianity, 7 vols. (I947), is an important counterbalance to impressions derived chiefly 
from the history of ideas. 
62 Prose Words, ed. Davies, Vol. II, pp. 27-8. 
